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Introduction
Third-party punishment (TPP) as a means of enforcing cooperation in response to social norm violations is probably an evolved behavior unique to humans (Riedl et al., 2012) . It was selected because it enabled large-scale and long-term cooperation among genetically unrelated individuals by deterring free-riding and cheating (Bowles and Gintis, 2004; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004) . As a result, large-scale human societies universally expect that criminal behavior will be punished, usually by impartial third-party decision-makers (i.e., stateempowered enforcers such as jurors and judges), who will assess moral responsibility and determine the appropriate legal punishment. Legal TTP has been institutionalized in our criminal justice systems: with a few exceptions, to be held responsible under criminal law, offenders must have committed their prohibited actions (actus reus) with a bad or guilty intent (mens rea) and those actions must have caused actual harm (Shen et al., 2011 ).
Free will is the often unspoken centerpiece of the criminal law, which presumes humans are responsible agents, who are free to choose to comply with social norms or violate them. We punish wrongdoers only because we believe they had the capacity to resist the wrongful act.
Attacking notions of free will has been a favorite tactic of defense lawyers through the ages. The famous American defense lawyer Clarence Darrow (1857 Darrow ( -1938 saved several murderers from the gallows, including Leopold and Loeb -two wealthy law students who were motivated to murder an innocent victim simply by their desire to commit a perfect crime-by making determinist arguments to jurors and judges, convincing them that in some deep way none of us is truly responsible for our actions. Darrow's defense strategy takes up one of the oldest and most controversial questions of moral philosophy and criminal law: the relationship between free will Page | 4 and moral responsibility. Can society hold a wrongdoer morally responsible, if his or her actions are completely determined?
In this study, we do not address whether free will exists or what its attributes might bequestions that have stimulated great debates among philosophers, criminologists, and recently neuroscientists (Nichols, 2011; Smith, 2011; Walter, 2011) . Instead, we focus on the empirical question of whether a belief in free will (BFW) affects the punishment of moral transgressions.
Philosophers have described two extremes of beliefs regarding free will: "Libertarians" have strong BFW, and believe we have the capacity to resist doing wrong and; therefore, we are morally responsible for our actions. "Determinists" believe that all events have material antecedent causes that determine what happens next and that free will is a mirage, and; therefore, at the extreme, that humans are no more morally responsible for the harms they cause than a falling tree.
Several behavioral studies have begun to examine the question of the impact of BFW on some of our moral behaviors, showing that BFW has behavioral consequences and is associated with a variety of pro-social behaviors, and, conversely, that discouraging a BFW increases antisocial behaviors, including cheating, stealing, aggression and defection (Vohs and Schooler, 2008; Baumeister et al., 2009 ). However, previous behavioral studies have been inconclusive as to the effects that BFW have on TPP. Some of those studies have found that libertarians punish more harshly than determinists (Viney et al., 1982) , some less (Nettler, 1959) and some observed no difference (Viney et al., 1988) . We surmised that this behavioral evidence might be mixed because previous researchers failed to consider whether any relationship between BFW and TPP might be influenced by the affective content of the offenses. A growing body of evidence reveals that affect plays an important role in many kinds of moral judgment (Greene et al., 2001; . For example, a recent behavioral study shows that when criminal offenses have a high affective content, lay people are more likely to attribute free will and moral responsibility to the wrongdoer, even when they believed that the wrongdoer's behavior was determined (Nichols and Knobe, 2007) .
In this study we investigated whether, why and how libertarians and determinists punish differently depending on varying affective content, with the aim of identifying the underlying brain regions responsible for these differences. Recent investigations have begun to uncover the neural underpinnings of TPP, including brain regions of the mentalizing network (e.g., medial prefrontal cortex, temporo-parietal junction), salience network (e.g., amygdala, insula), and central-executive network (e.g., dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, posterior parietal cortex), which are involved in determining moral responsibility and assigning appropriate punishment (Buckholtz et al., 2008; Schleim et al., 2011; Buckholtz and Marois, 2012; Yamada et al., 2012) .
We hypothesized that determining moral responsibility and punishment might vary dramatically depending on the subjective affective reactions caused by the criminal offenses. We predicted that libertarians would punish low affective offense more than determinists, since libertarians have more robust beliefs in moral responsibility. We therefore expected differential activation between libertarians and determinists in regions of the mentalizing network, in particular the medial prefrontal cortex and/or the right temporo-parietal junction, regions known to be involved in inferring social states (intention, beliefs) of others (Van Overwalle and Baetens, 2009; Young et al., 2010) . We also hypothesized that this difference in punishment behaviors between libertarians and determinists would disappear for high affective offenses because of a more prominent influence of affect on decision-making. We predicted a differential activation in the amygdala and/or the anterior insula, regions known to be associated with aversive emotional Page | 6 processing Buckholtz et al., 2008) , when comparing activations for the punishment of high versus low affective offenses, regardless of the subjects' BFW.
To test our hypotheses, we combined functional MRI (fMRI) with a TPP task, asking healthy subjects to estimate how much punishment a hypothetical offender deserved for a set of prototypical offenses ranging across severity of crime from property destruction and theft to rape and murder. An example of these well-studied vignettes was: "John knows the address of a woman who has highly offended him. As he had planned the day before, he waits there for the woman to return from work and, when she appears, John shoots her to death." (Robinson and Kurzban, 2007; Krueger et al., 2012) . After scanning, criminal scenarios were divided into low and high affective offenses based on subjects' affective experiences elicited by the criminal vignettes. Further, subjects were assigned into two matched groups, libertarians or determinists, based on a validated psychological instrument measuring belief in free will and scientific determinism (Paulhus and Carey, 2011) . Our results indicate that when punishing low affective criminal offenses, subjects with strong BFW punished more than subjects with weak BFW and showed greater activation in the right temporo-parietal junction, a region probably involved in attentional selection and attribution of intentions and beliefs of others. However, this effect disappeared in high affective cases, mirrored in an activation of the right insula, a region presumably involved in aversive interoceptive-emotional processing.
Methods

Subjects
We recruited 26 normal healthy volunteers (13 females, 13 males, years of age: 26.05.7, years of education: 16.92.6) for the fMRI study. Subjects were native English speakers and right-Page | 7 handed as determined from the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory (Oldfield, 1971) (mean±s.d.: 93.010.4), and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. They underwent a neurological examination by a board-certified neurologist during the previous 12 months, had no history of medical, psychiatric, or neurological diagnoses, and were not taking medication. Based on a brief psychological survey, subjects were excluded from our studies if they met one of the following two criteria: 1) experienced any trauma that involved either injury or threat of injury to themselves or a close family or friend member; or 2) were the victim of, or witnessed, a violent crime. All subjects participated for financial compensation, understood the study procedures, and gave written informed consent approved by the Institutional Review Board at the National Institute of Neurological Disorders and Stroke, Bethesda, MD, USA.
Stimuli and Experimental Task
Stimuli consisted of criminal vignettes (n=44); each describing an event during which a hypothetical offender named "John" engages intentionally in criminal offenses (Robinson and Kurzban, 2007) (Supplementary Tab. S1). The vignettes represent the typical crimes committed in the United States including theft by taking, theft by fraud, property destruction, assault, burglary, robbery, kidnapping, rape, and murder.
The experiment consisted of two judgment tasks: For the experimental condition, subjects were asked to estimate the punishment that John deserved for each vignette on a Likert-scale (no punishment, 0 to extreme punishment, 100). For the control condition, subjects were asked to estimate (but not to count) the number of syllables for each vignette on a Likert-scale (approximately 30 to approximately 95). During the fMRI experiment, each trial started with a fixation cross (+) (0.5 s) followed by a vignette (i.e., header and scenario) in the middle of the Page | 8 screen (12 s). Afterwards, the task (Legal Task or Syllables Task) and the Likert-scale were presented und the marker was always placed in the middle of the Likert-scale for each trial.
Using their response pads, subjects gave their answers by pressing the index (to move left) or middle finger (to move right) of their right hand until the marker reached the desired value and then by pressing the index finger of their left hand to mark their final decision (time limit 6 s). A blank screen with two fixation crosses (++) was displayed for a jittered inter-stimulus interval (mean 4 s, range 2-6 s). Before entering the scanner, subjects were familiarized with the task using a separate set of stimuli (to anchor the punishment scale). During each of the three experimental runs, subjects had to respond as quickly and accurately as possible and response times and punishment ratings were recorded for each of the randomly assigned trials. Note that each vignette was presented twice during the fMRI experiment (once in the experimental condition and once in the control condition) but never within the same run. The experiment lasted for approximately 2 hours (1 hour for scanning, 1 hour for the post-scan questionnaires).
Immediately after scanning, subjects completed several psychological surveys in a randomized order. First, subjects completed the Free Will and Determinism (FAD-Plus) questionnaire and were asked to rate their beliefs in free will, scientific determinism, and closely related constructs (fatalistic determinism, unpredictability) (5-point Likert scale: strongly disagree, 1 to strongly agree, 5) (Paulhus and Carey, 2011) . Second, subjects were asked to list what kinds of punishment they were imagining for punishment scores of 1, 25, 50, 75, and 100 to examine the internal scale of punishment applied during the experiment. Third, subjects were asked to rate their subjective affective experience elicited by each of the legal vignettes using a 5-point rating scale (valence: 1, positive to negative, 5; arousal: low, 1 to high, 5) version of the Self-Assessment Manikin (SAM) (Lang et al., 1993) . Fourth, subjects completed the Page | 9
Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) as a control measure to ensure that predicted group effects were not driven by group differences in empathy (sub-scales: perspective taking, empathic concern, personal distress, and fantasy; 5-point Likert scale: strongly disagree 1 to strongly agree 5) (Davis, 1983) . Finally, subjects completed the Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS-20) as a control measure to assure that the hypothesized group effects were not due by group differences in identifying and describing emotions (sub-scales: difficulty identifying feeling, difficulty describing feelings, and externally oriented thinking; 5-point Likert scale: strongly disagree 1 to strongly agree 5) (Bagby et al., 1994) .
Data Acquisition
Neuroimaging was performed on a 1.5 Tesla GE MRI scanner (General Electric, Milwaukee, where the first five volumes were discarded to allow for T1 equilibration effects.
Behavioral Data Analysis
The behavioral data analyses were carried out using SPSS 19.0 (SPSS Inc., Chicago, USA) with alpha set to P<0.05 (two-tailed). Data were normally distributed (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test) and assumptions for analyses of variance (Bartlett's test) were not violated. First, we averaged Page | 10 subjects' post-scanning affective ratings (valence, arousal) regarding criminal scenarios from the SAM instrument (Lang et al., 1993) and divided them based on a median split approach into low and high affective offenses. Second, we assigned subjects into two groups -one group believing more in free will ("libertarians") and another group believing more in scientific determinism ("determinists")-applying a median split on the difference score between subjects' belief in free will and scientific determinism from the Free Will and Determinism (FAD-Plus)
questionnaire (Paulhus and Carey, 2011 ANOVAs on experimental measures (punishment ratings, response times) and SAM ratings (valence, arousal) with Affect (low, high) as a within-subjects factor and Group (libertarians, determinists) as a between-subjects factor and performed planned follow-up independent-sample t tests to identify group effects of BFW on TPP.
fMRI Data Analysis
The fMRI data analyses were performed using BrainVoyager QX 2.0 (Brain Innovation, (Buchel et al., 1998) .
After computing the coefficients (beta parameters) for all regressors one statistical model was fit on the multi-subject level for the decision phase in the experiment. To reveal brain activations associated with the effects of BFW on TPP, a mixed 2 x 2 ANOVA on beta parameters was applied with Affect (E_L, E_H) as a within-subjects factor and Group (libertarian, determinist) as a between-subjects factor. Activations were reported using a threshold of q(FDR)<0.05 by applying a whole brain analysis approach (Genovese et al., 2002 (Talairach and Tournoux, 1988) .
RESULTS
Behavioral Results
To confirm that subjects were following the instructions defining the 100-point punishment scale
(no punishment=0 to extreme punishment=100), subjects were asked to list what kind of punishment they imagined during the experiment for selected punishment ratings after scanning. Arousal: r=0.92, P<0.001), indicating that subjects' degree of punishment were strongly associated with their degree of self-reported negative affective reactions toward criminal scenarios.
Next, criminal scenarios were divided into two groups based on a median split (mean±s.d., 3.39±0.70) for subjects' averaged post-scanning affective ratings (valence, arousal) using the SAM instrument (Lang et al., 1993) (Supplementary Fig. S1 (Fig. 2) .
(Insert Figure 2 about here)
Neuroimaging Results
A GLM analysis was applied and a random-effect analysis on beta parameters was performed for the decision phase of the experiment. We ran a 2 Affect (low, high) x 2 Group (libertarian vs.
determinist) ANOVA on beta parameters to identify those brain regions whose BOLD responses were associated with the impact of BFW on TPP. The ANOVA revealed an interaction effect of Affect x Group in the right temporo-parietal junction (R TPJ, Talairach peak x,y,z: 50,-50,15) (F(1,24)=22.46, P<0.0001) (Fig. 3) . Planned follow-up independent-samples t tests showed that libertarians had higher activations in the R TPJ than determinists (t(24)=-2.86, P<0.009) for low affective offenses, whereas activations in this region was the same for both groups for high affective offenses (t(24)=0.45, P=0.655). Moreover, the ANOVA showed no main effect of Group, but revealed a significant main effect of Affect in the right anterior insula (R AI,
Talairach peak x,y,z: 30,14,12) (F(1,24)=31.10, P<0.001), indicating that both groups activated the R AI more when punishing high affective compared to low affective offenses (Fig. 4) .
(Insert Figures 3 and 4 about here)
Discussion
In this study, we addressed the question whether libertarians and determinists punish criminal offenses differently as impartial third-party decision-makers and investigated the underlying Page | 15 neural signatures reflecting these differences. We predicted that the existing inconsistent evidence regarding the impact of BFW on TPP might be a result of studies failing to distinguish between high and low affective content of criminal offenses. Our findings revealed that libertarians punished low affective cases more harshly than determinists, initiated by a stronger activation in the right temporo-parietal junction, a region probably involved in attentional selection to salient stimuli and attribution of temporary intentions and beliefs of others. This effect disappeared for high affective cases, presumably due to activation of the right anterior insula, a region of the salience network probably involved in aversive interoceptive-emotional processing.
Although subjects' hypothetical legal decisions had no direct, real-world consequences for real criminal offenders, our post-scan debriefing results demonstrated that their punishment assessments were a good proxy measure for real-world legal criminal judgments. Subjects applied an implicit legal metric: associating lower punishment judgments with shorter jail times [1, 25] , higher punishment judgments with longer jail times [50, 75] , and highest punishment judgments with life imprisonment or the death penalty [100]. Moreover, subject's punishment increased as a function of their self-reported affective reactions toward criminal scenarios, replicating previous evidence showing that sanctions are driven by affective reactions toward norm violations (Darley and Pittman, 2003; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004) .
As hypothesized, we found that libertarians punished low affective offenses significantly more harshly (an average of 10% more) than determinists as evidenced by a stronger activation in the right temporo-parietal junction, but no difference between groups were observed when punishing high affective offenses. The right temporo-parietal junction, at the border between the superior temporal and angular gyrus, is linked to a number of higher order cognitive functions, Page | 16 related to attentional selection such as reorienting attention to salient stimuli (Mesulam, 1981; Mitchell, 2008) and social cognition such as attribution of mental states (intentions, beliefs) of self or others (Van Overwalle and Baetens, 2009; Young and Saxe, 2009 ). This line of evidence suggests that determinists punished less because they dismissed the (bad) intention, because they have doubts about the extent to which any of us are truly in control of our intentional behaviors. In contrast, libertarians arguably punished more harshly since they focused more likely on the negative intention involved in the offenses, driving a more robust commitment to moral responsibility, and therefore, leading to a stronger activation of the right temporo-parietal junction. Indeed, a recent study has shown that disruption of the right temporoparietal junction with transcranial magnetic stimulation caused subjects to judge attempted harms as less morally forbidden and more morally permissible (Young et al., 2010) , providing additional evidence that interfering with activity in the right temporo-parietal junction disrupts the capacity to use mental states in determining responsibility.
However, as hypothesized the observed behavioral and neural differences between determinists band libertarians disappeared for high affective scenarios. When subjects of both groups punished high affective as compared to low affective offenses, they showed a differential activation in the right anterior insula. The anterior insula is part of the salience network (Seeley et al., 2007; Bressler and Menon, 2010) , which is involved in the orientation of attention to the most homestatically relevant (salient) of ongoing interpersonal and extrapersonal events (Kelly et al., 2008; Eckert et al., 2009) . Recent evidence supports the view that the anterior insula is linked to interoceptive awareness of body states as well as emotional processing via representations of signals of (especially aversive) internal states (Phan et al., 2002; Craig, 2003) .
For example, greater right anterior insular gray matter volume is associated with increased Page | 17 accuracy in the subjective sense of the inner body and with negative emotional experience (Critchley et al., 2004) . Given that the anterior insula is also sensitive to emotions linked to sociality such as moral disgust towards violation of social and moral norms (Sanfey et al., 2003; Greene et al., 2004; Chapman and Anderson, 2012) , the engagement of this region in aversive interoceptive-emotional processing for high affective scenarios presumably muted the contributions of the right temporo-parietal junction. A recent study demonstrated that the right anterior insula and right temporo-parietal junction are structurally and functionally connected to each other (Mars et al., 2012) , belonging to a common ventral attentional network that mediates reorienting of attention in response to behaviorally relevant events (Corbetta and Shulman, 2002) . This would potentially allow either structure, given the right context, to dominate processing. Taken together, our imaging and behavioral results suggest that people's negative affective reaction toward extreme norm violations causes determinists to act like libertarians when punishing high harms.
There are a couple of limitations to our study that deserve discussion. First, we divided the criminal scenarios into low and high affective offenses based on a recent finding, showing that lay people are more likely to attribute free will and moral responsibility to the wrongdoer when criminal offenses have a high affective content, even when they believed that the wrongdoer's behavior was determined (Nichols and Knobe, 2007) . Although in our study subjects' assessment of punishment were strongly associated with their degree of self-reported negative affective reactions toward criminal scenarios, other differences between these low and high affective offenses (i.e., other than affect) might have generated the observed differences in behavior and brain activity. Whereas our criminal scenarios fulfilled the criminal law's central tenet of punishment, i.e., a hypothetical offender committed with a guilty intent a set of Page | 18 prototypical offenses ranging across severity of crime; however, future studies should investigate other potential factors that might modify the effects of BFW on TPP such as types of harm to the victims (e.g., physical, financial) and types of mental states of the defendant (e.g., purposeful, knowing, reckless, negligent) at the time the crime was committed (Shen et al., 2011) .
Second, we divided subjects into determinists and libertarians based on the FAD-Plus questionnaire measuring different beliefs in free will (free will, scientific determinism, fatalistic determinism, unpredictability) (Paulhus and Carey, 2011) . We created these two extreme groups by applying a median split on the difference score between subjects' belief in free will and scientific determinism. Although group differences were observed in both behavior and brain activity and the groups were matched on related beliefs (fatalistic determinism, unpredictability), future studies should broaden our findings by utilizing groups that differ on each of the FADPlus subscales. Moreover, future studies should investigate how manipulation of subjects' belief in free will, either by encouraging to shift beliefs toward greater free will or persuading to reject free will, modifies the observed patterns in punishment behaviors and brain activities.
In conclusion, our study demonstrates that the impact of BFW on TPP is contextdependent. Our findings of the importance of context helps to resolve why there is a mixed literature on the effects of BFW on TPP, and suggests that without controlling for contextual variables such as affective content of the criminal offense, the philosophical debate between beliefs in free will and determinism will remain obstinately persistent. Our results may also lead to some practical legal applications. In low affective offenses, BFW might influence jurors' blaming decisions in ways to which lawyers, judges, and the law as a whole might need to attend. In high affective offenses, judges and lawyers should be less concerned about jurors'
BFW and more concerned about the emotional impact of the crime. depending on affective content. Libertarians had higher activations in the R TPJ than determinists for low affective offenses, whereas activation in this region was the same for both groups for high affective offenses. For display purposes, statistical images were overlaid onto the mean anatomical image from the group of subjects in Talairach space and were reversed left to right according to radiologic convention. 
